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Abstract
We look at how social norms regarding health affect the dynamics of an epidemic
of NCDs. We present an overlapping generations model in which agents live for
three periods (childhood, adulthood and old age). Adulthood consumption choices
have a impact on the health capital of the following period, which is in part inher-
ited by their offspring and affects their offsprings’ probability of developing a NCD.
As a result of this intergenerational externality, agents would choose lower health
conditions and higher unhealthy activities than that which is socially optimal. In
addition, parental choices affect their own old age health capital with which their
offspring compare their own. A social norm imposing agents to be as healthy as the
previous generation balances the negative effects of unhealthy adulthood choices.
Fiscal policies alone or combined with public policies regarding social norms can
be used to restore optimality. Our results underline the interplay between sin taxes
and health-related social norms.
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1 Introduction
By 1940 infectious diseases were overtaken by non-communicable chronic diseases (NCDs)
as the major cause of death in the US (Ritchie and Roser, 2017). Presently, NCDs account
for 70% of worldwide deaths. However, the WHO estimates that 80% of NCDs’ premature
deaths are preventable. Prevention would imply a change in the most important risk
factors of NCDs, such as unhealthy eating, smoking and physical inactivity.
Despite major past and present health threats, life expectancy has been increasing
steadily for the last two centuries. The average life expectancy in the OECD was 80.7 in
2017, 10 additional years than in 1970 (OECD, 2019). Increasing life expectancy is not
only an effect of important reductions in child mortality; life expectancy has increased
for all age groups. Moreover, individuals are not only living longer, they are also living
in better health, and in 2019, the average person in the world was expected to live five
more healthy years than in 2000.1
Increasing life and healthy life expectancy may lead to the belief that one should be at
least as healthy as the previous generation. In this paper we look at how such a common
belief, or social norm, may affect the dynamic of an epidemics of NCDs emphasizing its
intergenerational determinants. Additionally, we analyze how policy instruments can be
used to enhance welfare, and in particular, we focus on the role of fiscal policies and social
norms.
From social norms, we understand a pattern of behavior that is self-enforcing at the
group level, as defined by Young (1993). We focus on health capital as the dimension of
comparison and consider the reference group to be the previous generation. It is undoubt-
edly problematic to encompass all of the dimensions of health in a single measure but
commonly used proxies for health capital are, obviously, life and healthy life expectancy,
but also height (see, among others, Case and Paxson, 2008; and Deaton, 2008) and body
mass index (BMI) (see, for instance, WHO, 2018). However, the existence of a social
norm, such as increasing health capital with regard to previous cohorts, remains a rele-
vant scientific question. It cannot be denied, however, how startling it was to observe the
decrease in the US life expectancy at birth by less than six months for four consecutive
years from 2014.2 Both the media and the scientific community have discussed the sub-
ject extensively, as if losses in life expectancy do not occur in this present age (see Woolf
and Schoomaker, 2019). Such reaction suggests the existence of a socially accepted norm
as regards the adoption of health improvements with respect to previous cohorts.3
1https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/gho-ghe-hale-healthy-life-
expectancy-at-birth, accessed January 20, 2021.
2https://data.oecd.org/healthstat/life-expectancy-at-birth.htm
3It is still too soon to understand the full effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on life expectancy but,
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Social norms have been identified in health related behaviors such as alcohol consump-
tion (Perkins and Berkowitz, 1986), smoking (Rodŕıguez-Planas and Sanz-de-Galdeano,
2019), or eating behaviors (see Higgs, 2015 for a survey on the psychologic aspects of so-
cial norms of eating behavior). Moreover, other contributions focus on the role of social
norms on BMI (see, for example, Etilé, 2007 and Dragone and Savorelli, 2012).
In this paper we consider a social norm with respect to health capital, which can bee
seen as encompassing all health-related behaviors. We assume the reference group to
be the previous cohort: this means that individuals compare their own life-expectancy
to that of previous cohorts. This has been a well-accepted assumption in the literature
since Hamermesh (1985). Hamermesh (1985) was a pioneer in attempting to understand
whether individuals are realistic in forming their expected life horizons over which they
maximize. He concludes that individuals use information regarding past cohorts’ life
expectancy (reflected in their contemporaneous life tables) to infer information on sub-
jective life expectancy. His results were revalidated by Hurd and McGarry (1995), with a
larger and more representative 1992 sample of individuals born from 1931 to 1941. Ad-
ditionally, they found that subjective life expectancies are correlated with own parents’
longevity experience.
The social norm imposing one to be at least as healthy as the previous generation
assumes a utility gain when individuals attain a higher health capital than the previous
cohort. Therefore, another clarification is required, which concerns the utility gain when
individuals behave accordingly to the social norm and live longer than the previous cohort.
The literature on wellbeing supports this assumption. In fact, researchers have first
noticed that well being does not improve with absolute levels of income or health, but
instead with relative increases in each (see Easterling, 1974, 1995; Deaton, 2008 and, for a
survey, Borghesi and Vercelli, 2010 and the references therein). Consequently, individuals’
life satisfaction and wellbeing appear to be more a function of a model with income and
health aspirations. In our setup, this is translated into a utility gain if individuals attain
a higher health capital (life expectancy) than the previous cohort.
More precisely, we present an overlapping generations model in which agents live for
three periods (childhood, adulthood and old age), and where the dynamics of the economy
are based on health capital accumulation (Grossman, 1972). All economic decisions are
made at adulthood and therefore parents decide upon their consumption levels and those
of their offspring. More specifically, parents decide upon the consumption the levels of
unhealthy goods (as, for example, salt, sugar, saturated fat but also second-hand smoking)
for instance, Andrasfaya and Goldman, 2021 estimate a 1.13-year decrease for the US population. The
present health crisis is without doubt an extreme event, and the unprecedented political and societal
responses world-wide are evidence of the importance that society attaches to health.
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and preventative measures (physical activity, medical care, etc.) that affect the level of
health capital of the following period. The health capital of the following period is in part
inherited by their offspring. Therefore, choices in adulthood have a direct impact on the
inherited health capital of their offspring. Additionally, adulthood choices also affect their
offspring’s probability of developing a NCD in old age. These two first mechanisms were
previously present in Goulão and Pérez-Barahona (2014) and were used to suggest that
the spread of NCDs can be rationalized as a result of the intergenerational transmission
of modifiable risk factors. In addition, we assume here that parental choices in turn affect
their offspring’ inherited social norms; that is, parental choices affect their own old age
health capital with which their offspring compare their own. We show that the social
norm on health capital counterbalances the intergenerational transmission of a modifiable
risk factor enhancing health capital and decreasing the probability of NCDs.
Specifically, we model the social norm on health capital by introducing a utility loss
resulting from a comparison with the health of the past generations’ health. We assume
a model of health aspirations, where utility gains emerge from health improvements with
respect to previous generation (except in Section 4, where we generalize the utility func-
tion). Therefore, from an individual’s point of view, they prefer the lowest possible social
norm; that is, no social norm at all. However, from the point of view of a social planner,
a positive level of social norms is desirable as it allows the planner to internalize the
intergenerational externalities. Using social norms as policy instruments raises several
conceptual and practical questions. “Social norms interventions” aim to change the pat-
tern of behavior that is self-enforcing at the group level. This approach has been followed
in developing countries to try to change harmful practices, such as female genital mutila-
tion, violence or child marriage (see Cislaghi and Heise, 2018 and the references therein).
Such an approach would be translated in our model as an exogenous (policy driven) shock
leading to a change in the health capital of the previous cohort. Another possibility is to
assume that a policy maker can affect the degree of self-enforcement of the social norm.
This corresponds to an exogenous (policy driven) shock resulting in a change of the social
ties in the economy. Although we do not model this process (and assume it instead the
result of a black box), it is interesting to acknowledge its implications. We show that
the social norm can be used to offset the other intergenerational externalities due to the
transmission of health capital and modifiable risk factors. In a way the social norm can
be used along with taxes to decentralize the social optimum and, in particular, to escape
health capital traps.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic
environment. Then, individuals’ choices and the particular role of social norms are ana-
lyzed in Section 3. In Section 4, we characterize the social optimum and discuss the role
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of public policies to restore optimality. Section 5 concludes.
2 Social norms on health capital
We assume a discrete-time infinity-horizon economy populated by overlapping generations
of agents living for three periods: childhood, adulthood, and old age. Time is indexed by
t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞, agents are identical within each generation, and there is no population
growth (the size of each generation is normalized to 1).
Individuals have an expected lifetime utility function Ut(ct, vt, ht+1, nt, πt). At time t,
adult agents care about consumption ct and unhealthy consumption, vt (or modifiable risk
factors). They are also concerned about their health capital when old ht+1 (Grossman;
1972, 2000). We assume that individuals inherit from their parents’ tastes with regard
to health capital, which is similar to the model of aspirations of de la Croix and Michel
(1999). Specifically, offspring are given a frame of reference of health capital, i.e., a norm
nt, against which they evaluate their old age health capital, ht+1. Let nt = εht, with
ε > 0 and we suppose ∂Ut/∂ε < 0.
Agents take all decisions at adulthood. Adult agents allocate their exogenous income
wt among consumption, unhealthy activities, and health investments mt as medical care
and physical activity. The corresponding budget constraint is
wt = ct + vt +mt. (1)
When elderly, individuals might suffer from a NCD with a probability πt, and this
depends on their health capital, as specified below. Specifically, we consider that Ut(·) is a
strictly increasing function of ct, vt, and ht+1, but decreasing in πt and nt.
4 In particular,
we can consider the following function in order to get closed-form solutions:
Ut(ct, vt, ht+1, πt, nt) = ln ct+λ ln vt+(1−πt)γ ln(ht+1−nt)+πtγ(1−φ) ln(ht+1−nt), (2)
where λ > 0 represents the weight that agents give to unhealthy activities, and γ > 0
stands for their concern about future health capital. The disutility of suffering from a
NCD is captured by φ ∈ [0, 1] and is caused by the morbidity of a disease and time
loss due to treatment, which reduces the utility driven from health capital.5 Finally, we
note the effects of social norms: specifically, that the logarithmic specification implicitly
imposes the restriction that ht+1 > nt = εht, i.e., agents enjoy a higher health capital
4We also assume that ∂2Ut(·)/∂c2t , ∂2Ut(·)/∂v2t , ∂2Ut(·)/∂h2t+1 are strictly negative, and
limct→0 ∂Ut(·)/∂ct, limvt→0 ∂Ut(·)/∂vt, limht+1→0 ∂Ut(·)/∂ht+1 = +∞.
5Note that we allow for the two extreme cases: mortal disease (φ = 1), and negligible morbidity
(φ = 0).
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than the previous cohort. Also, for ε → 0, the model reduces to a model with no social
norms, where agents fully enjoy the health capital accumulated when old. This case is
informative as a benchmark.
We start by assuming, simplistically, that the probability of suffering from a NCD is
a decreasing function of an agent’s health capital at adulthood, i.e., πt = π(ht), such that
∂π(ht)/∂ht < 0, limht→ 0 π(ht) = πH and limht→∞ π(ht) = πL, with 0 < πL < πH < 1.
Assuming πt = π(ht) means to neglect that agents’ actions have an impact on their own
probability of developing a NCD. This is of course not consistent with the literature on
sin and unhealthy goods consumption that demonstrates the role of one’s consumption on
one’s potential development of a NCD. Nonetheless, it allows us to focus firstly on the role
of social norms on the intergenerational transmission mechanism, since we assume that
adults’ consumption choices solely affect their offspring’ inherited health capital (ht).
Even in this extreme case, there is a role for corrective taxation. We then analyze in
Section 4 the broader setup where we assume πt = π(ht+1), i.e., individuals’ consumption
additionally affects their own probability of developing an NCD.
As in Grossman (1972, 2000), our model assumes that health capital accumulates over
time. In particular, we consider the following law of motion:
ht+1 = (1− δ)ht + σmt − αvt, (3)
where 0 < δ < 1 and σ, α > 0.
Health capital in old age, ht+1, is a function of the inherited health capital ht, ac-
counting for the depreciation rate δ. Yet, agents may modify their health capital through
health investments and unhealthy activities during adulthood. Thus, ht+1, increases with
health investments (mt) where σ captures their effectiveness, and reduces with unhealthy
consumption (vt), where α captures their harmfulness. Therefore adulthood choices, vt
and mt, modify their offspring’ inherited health capital, as well as their offspring’ inherited
health capital norm. This assumption is consistent with recent research on epigenetics
suggesting precisely that the risk factors of NCDs may affect the health capital of follow-
ing generations (see for example Alm et al., 2017, on the grand parents’ intergenerational
transmission of health capital due to diet choices, and Barrès, 2016 for a dissemination
article on epigenetics).
The parameter δ captures the depreciation of health capital from adulthood to old age
(Grossman, 1972, 2000). It accounts for ageing and encompasses all exogenous factors
that may decrease health capital during adulthood. offspring inherit the fraction of health
capital not depreciated by the end of their parents’ adulthood. With such modelling, we
aim to illustrate that individuals make consumption choices that increase or decrease
their body mass index (BMI), which is a proxy for health capital. The health capital
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they then have at adulthood is transmitted towards their own offspring. They grow old in
the following period and may develop diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, or various types
of cancers, given their BMI. Because NCDs only occur at old age, we model the utility
loss they impose through the parameter φ, which implies a reduction of the expected
utility of health capital when old, as implied by the two last terms in (2).
As a result, the intergenerational transmission of NCDs occurs through three different
channels. First, adulthood choices have a direct impact on their offspring’ inherited health
capital. Second, adulthood choices also affect their offspring’ probability of developing a
NCD in their old age. These two first mechanisms were already present in Goulão and
Pérez-Barahona (2014). Third, by affecting their own old age health capital, parental
choices then in turn affect their offspring’ inherited norms in relation to health capital.
3 The decentralized economy











Since π = π(ht) and ht is taken as given we can characterize the following closed form
solutions for the specific utility function (2):
ct =
σwt + (1− δ − ε)ht
σ[λ+ 1 + γ(1− φπt)]
, (5)
vt =
λ[σwt + (1− δ − ε)ht]
(σ + α)[λ+ 1 + γ(1− φπt)]
, (6)
mt =
σ[γ(σ + α)(1− φπt) + λα]wt − (1− δ − ε)[(λ+ 1)σ + α]ht
σ(σ + α)[λ+ 1 + γ(1− φπt)]
. (7)
A sufficient condition for ct, vt > 0, is that ε ≤ 1−δ, i.e., social norms are not too strong.
Strong social norms imply high level of health capital, and the only way to increase
health capital is to increase health investment mt (see Eq. 3). However mt is increased
at the cost of pushing down general and unhealthy consumptions, otherwise the budget
constraint (1) is not respected. Thus, ε ≤ 1−δ ensures ct, vt > 0 and, in this case, mt > 0
is guaranteed considering that agents’ income is high enough (see Eq. 7). For the sake
of presentation, we assume ε ≤ 1− δ and that wt is sufficiently large to satisfy positivity.
Appendix A considers the case of strong social norms.
From (7)-(5) we can observe that, all other things being equal, first, income (wt)
increases both consumption and unhealthy consumption but it also raises health invest-
ment. Second, for a given probability of NCDs, greater inherited health conditions (ht)
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make health investments less valuable. Therefore health investment decrease while gen-
eral and unhealthy consumption increase. Third, a greater probability of suffering from a
NCD, a greater disutility of NCD (φ), or a lower concern about future health capital (γ),
all decrease old age expected utility. Consequently, general and unhealthy consumption
increase and health investments decrease. Finally, stronger inherited norms in relation
to health capital increase health investments and therefore lowers general and unhealthy
consumption.
3.1 Dynamics
Given the initial health conditions h0 > 0, the dynamics of the economy is completely
characterized by the evolution of health capital, as described by (3). By substituting
(5)-(7) into (3), we get the corresponding transition function:
ht+1 =
ε(1 + λ)ht + γ(1− φπ(ht))[(1− δ)ht + σwt]
1 + λ+ γ(1− φπ(ht))
≡ ϕ(ht). (8)
Note that ϕ(ht) > 0 for all the values of the parameters assumed. Moreover, the stronger
the social norm (ε) the greater the health capital when old, which is transmitted to their
offspring (ht+1).
We specify the function π(ht) in order to get further analytical results. In particular,
consistent with the hypothesis on π(ht), we assume
π(ht) =
{
πH if ht < h
c,
πL if ht ≥ hc.
(9)
The above step function assumes two possible probabilities of developing a NCD, depend-
ing on the health capital level. Considering a step function is obviously a simplification of
reality but nonetheless it captures the main features of much of the medical literature on
NCDs. Take, for example, the BMI cut off points proposed by WHO (1995). These cut
off points (hc in our step function) have been defined to reflect the risks of NCDs (πL and
πH in the step function) to which the general population is exposed based on the simple
BMI measure (weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared, kg/m2). Indeed,
BMI threshold levels are a stylized representation of a complex reality but precisely due
to their simplicity they can be used worldwide as guidelines and alerts in the prevention
and treatment of NCDs.6 In general, the medical literature is based on threshold levels
above which it is assumed that the probability of diseases suddenly increases.
6A complex reality sometimes calls for reformulation. In 2004, the WHO proposed different BMI
thresholds to the Asian population because the medical literature suggested that the Asian population
faced the risks of NCDs at lower BMI levels than the European population, see WHO (2004).
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≡ ϕπL(ht) if ht ≥ hc.
(10)
We assume for simplicity that all exogenous elements of the model are constant.
Therefore, neglecting technical progress and population growth, we focus on steady-state
equilibria defined as fixed points of (10), i.e., ϕ(h∗) = h∗. Notice that this notion of
long-run equilibrium requires 0 ≤ ε < 1 due to (2). Individuals’ frame of reference for
their own health capital is thus a proportion of the health capital of the precedent cohort.
Assuming the functional form (9) we can show that the dynamics of the model admits
two stable steady-states.
Proposition 1 Let us define h∗πi as:
h∗πi =
γσ(1− φπi)w
(1− ε)(1 + λ) + δγ(1− φπi)
, (11)
where 0 ≤ ε < 1, i = {H,L}, and 0 < h∗πH < h
∗
πL
. If 0 < h∗πH < h
c < h∗πL, there
exist two steady-states given by h∗πH and h
∗
πL




0 < hc < h∗πH < h
∗
πL




Moreover, all the steady-states are stable.
Proof. For an exogenous given income wt = w, we get (11) by taking ht = ht+1 = h
∗
in (10). Provided that 0 ≤ ε < 1, it is easy to verify that 0 < ϕ′πi(ht) < 1 for all ht.
This implies that each steady-state is strictly positive and stable. One can also check
that h∗πH < h
∗
πL
since h∗πi is a decreasing function of πi. Moreover, as it is clear from (10),
multiplicity of equilibria only happens when the cut off hc is such that h∗πH < h
c < h∗πL .
The richer the economy, the better the long-term health conditions. Indeed, a wealthier
household consumes more but also increases its investments in health. A greater effec-
tiveness of health investments make it easier to reach a higher level of health capital;
increases in the weight given to the future make relatively more important health capital
in old age, leading to a higher long-term level.
The two stable steady-states are represented in Figure 1. For a high probability of




which is below h∗πL , the equilibrium level of capital for a low probability of NCDs (πL).
Note also that ϕ(ht)πH < ϕ(ht)πL for all ht > 0 because ϕ(ht)πi is a decreasing function
of πi, and that this is also true for ϕ(0)πi . Moreover ∂ϕ
′
πi
(ht)/∂πi ≤ 0 and, therefore,
ϕ(ht) is steeper for lower probabilities of disease.
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In an economy starting with poor health conditions, i.e., h0 < h
c, agents strongly
discount their old age because the probability of developing NCDs would be high. Then,
they substitute health investments with consumption (including unhealthy activities),
which leads to a long-run equilibrium h∗πH characterized by a low level of health capital
and a high probability of NCDs. This is in stark contrast to an economy such that
h0 ≥ hc. The lower discount of old age induces agents to invest more in health and,
therefore, the economy ends up in a healthier situation h∗πL and with a low probability
of NCDs. Taking wt = w, ht = h
∗
πi
and πt = πi in (5)-(7) for i = {H,L}, we get the











Figure 1: The two stable steady-states. The “low steady-state”, in which a low level of
health capital is associated with a high probability of NCDs; and the “high steady-state”,
in which a high level of health capital is associated with a low probability of NCDs.
3.2 Long-run equilibrium and social norms interventions
Having characterized the dynamics of the economy, we can now focus on the role of so-
cial norms on the long-run equilibria as illustrated in Figure 2.7 As observed above, the
stronger the social norm the greater the health capital when old, which is subsequently
transmitted to their offspring, i.e., ∂ht+1/∂ε > 0, see (8). This translates into a higher
steady-state value of health capital, ∂h∗πi/∂ε > 0. Graphically, the slope of the transition
function increases with the strength of the norm (∂ϕ′πi(ht)/∂ε > 0). Interestingly, this
effect is greater for higher probabilities of developing a disease, ∂(∂h∗πi/∂ε)/∂πi > 0. In
7Note that all the results of this section and the following parts of the article are also valid for the
case of strong social norms. See Appendix A.
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Figure 2, this implies a steeper rotation for high levels of probability of NCDs, which
results in a higher increase of the steady-state value of health capital for higher proba-
bilities of NCDs. Intergenerational social norms encourage individuals to invest more in
health. In terms of long-term health status, the norm counterbalances the reduced value
for old age induced by a high probability of NCDs. The asymmetry of the effect comes
from the fact that individuals with a low probability of disease value their old age more.
A smaller discount already induces significant levels of long-term health capital, even in
the absence of any norm. Therefore, the relative change due to the norm of their long-run






Figure 2: Social norms are more effective for economies in the health trap
An important implication of the effect of the social norm on the equilibrium is that
social norms could be used as policy instruments. The literature on “social norms inter-
ventions” focus on the change in the pattern of behavior of the reference group, taking as
immutable the social ties and social process upon which the social norm is built (see the
Introduction). In our model, this would be illustrated as a shock on the health capital
of the previous cohort (ht), achieved with an increase in an exogenous parameter; σ for
instance. This would mean a higher impact of health investments in the accumulation of
health capital. Shocks in other parameters such as a higher income (w) or a decrease in
the weight that agents give to unhealthy activities λ would generate similar effects, see
(11). Additionally, a positive shock in the social norm ε would also have a positive effect
on the accumulation of health capital in the long term.
Suppose a policy maker can indeed change the strength of the norm ε. We do not
enter into a discussion of how such a process would be achieved but focus on the analysis
of its implications. Figure 3 below shows how social norms can induce the economy to
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Figure 3: Social norms can be used to escape the health trap.
steady-state value of h always to the right of hc, see (10). In this case, even an economy
starting with a low health capital could achieve the high-health-capital-low-probability-
of-disease steady-state if social norms are strong enough. We summarize this outcome in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Let us assume hc < wσ
δ
. There is a strength level of the norm εc ∈ (0, 1)
such that h∗πH (ε) ≥ h
c for ε ≥ εc. Moreover, h∗πL would be the only long-run equilibrium
of the economy.
Proof. Considering πi = πH in (11), one can find that h
∗
πH




(1− ε). Solving this condition, we identify the critical value




Notice that εc should be lower than 1 because ε ∈ (0, 1). This is only possible if hc < wσ
δ
.
Finally, the low steady-state disappears when h∗πH (ε) ≥ h
c: as in Figure 2, the transition
function (10) associated to πH crosses the 45
◦-line after hc and, therefore, the economy
ends up in h∗πL for all h0 > 0.
As is clear from Proposition 2, the threshold value of health capital hc, as defined
in the step function (9), is determinant to avoid the low-health-capital-high-probability-
of-disease steady-state. We have not been precise about what influences hc. We believe
it clearly depends on biology, obviously, but also on the quality of medical technology
and health care available, and captures the ability of national health systems to reduce
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premature mortality and morbidity due to NCDs. As examples, consider the prescription
of drugs to prevent heart attacks and strokes, early screening of some types of cancers,
and vaccinations against human papillomavirus. In fact, premature deaths due to NCDs
occur mainly in low-and-middle income countries (82%) and the WHO highlights national
health systems responses as key instruments in reducing these deaths (see WHO, 2014;
in particular, Annex 1). In our model, this translates to having two different economies:
a low-middle-income economy with a high hc below which probabilities of disease are
higher, and a high-income one in which an appropriate health care system, allows for a
lower level of hc.
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of improvements in medical technology on escaping the
health capital trap. Appropriate health care and medical technology reduce the level of
health capital below which individuals may develop a NCD with high probability from
hc0 to h
c




h*πLh*πH h0c h1c 
Figure 4: Improvement in medicine effectiveness (↓ hc ) can be used to escape the health
capital trap.
A subsequent effect is that social norms do not need to be as strong to escape the
health capital trap with improvements in health technology and care. Taking (12) it can
be checked that ∂εc/∂hc > 0. That is, a decrease in hc due to improvements in health
technology lower the critical level of the social norm needed to escape the health capital
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trap.8, 9
The critical level εc needed to escape the health capital trap is also decreasing in
income (w), in the effectiveness of health investments (σ) and in the weight given to
the future (γ). All the three parameters have a positive impact on the trajectory of
health capital (see Section 3.1), and therefore a lower level of εc is sufficient to escape
the health capital trap. Conversely, increases in the high probability of NCDs (πH), in
the depreciation of health capital (δ), in the morbidity of the disease (φ), and in the
relative utility of unhealthy eating (λ), all lead to increases in the minimum level of the
social norm needed to escape the health capital trap. The effect is just the reverse, as
all parameters lead to a decrease in the trajectory of health capital to the left of hc and
therefore a higher level of the critical social norm is needed to escape the health capital
trap. Both higher levels of a high probability of disease and of morbidity lower the utility
of health capital in old age: if the depreciation of health capital increases, lower levels of
health capital will be attained at old age for the same investments, while increases in the
relative utility of unhealthy eating make it more costly to invest in medical technology.
4 Welfare analysis
As observed before, households do not take into account the effect of their decisions on
the welfare of future generations. They disregard, in particular, how their choices affect
the probability of suffering from a NCDs of subsequent cohorts. We show in this section,
that this results in suboptimal levels of health investments, as well as excessively high
consumption and modifiable risk factors, and on an over-prevalence of NCDs (suboptimal
levels of health capital) and suboptimal welfare level.
We commence the welfare analysis by describing the social optimum in a generalized
version of the framework introduced in Section 2. This allows us to identify the different
mechanisms behind the intergenerational externality stressing the role played by social
8This effect is not exclusive to NCDs. Consider the current COVID-19 crisis and take the social
norm to be social interactions among individuals. In 2020, and in the absence of medical technology to
deal with the virus, nations worldwide were forced to impose an extreme level of the “social norm” and
impose lockdown to minimize social interactions. Though a careful analysis is still required in due course,
countries in which screening was available and infected individuals were identified have not (to the best
of our knowledge) imposed lockdowns, even though strict rules of social interaction were imposed, such
as the use of masks or minimum physical distancing among individuals.
9Note also in Proposition 2 that the condition hc < wσδ is required because in our model ε is bounded
by 1 (otherwise, εc would be greater than 1). An interpretation for this condition is that there is a social
norm that makes the economy avoid the health trap if medical technology (or health systems) are good
enough, and thus, if hc is low enough.
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norms. Then, we will consider sin taxes as a policy to re-establish social optimality
and remark on how the negative effect of the externality is attenuated under the pres-
ence of social norms on health capital. This requires an investigation as to what extent
strengthening social norms can lessen the pressure for high taxes, and ultimately opens
the discussion about the optimal level of social norms.
4.1 Social optimum vs. decentralized solution
Let us first study the social optimum by considering a full-fledged forward-looking social
planner, who maximizes a social welfare function that includes the utility of all gener-
ations. We also generalize the setup considered in the previous sections, assuming that
adult consumption affects one own probability of NCDs. This assumption corresponds
more to reality where NCDs are mainly evidenced after 40 years old and also depend on
adulthood eating choices. In the previous sections, we have neglected this important ef-
fect to focus entirely on the intergenerational externality and on the role of social norms.
We now add a layer of complexity and assume π = π(ht+1), with ∂π(ht+1)/∂ht+1 < 0,
limht+1→ 0 π(ht+1) = πH and limht+1→∞ π(ht+1) = πL, with 0 < πL < πH < 1.




tUt (ct, vt, nt, ht+1, πt) subject to (1), (3), and ct, vt,mt, ht > 0,
where wt and h0 (initial condition) are given, and β ∈ (0, 1) represents the inter-temporal
discount rate. For this problem the Lagrangian is
L = β−1U−1 +
∞∑
t=0
βt [Ut (ct, vt, nt, ht+1, πt) + ξt+1Ωt] , (13)
where Ωt ≡ (1−δ)ht+σwt−(σ+α)vt−σct−ht+1 and ξt+1 > 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier
(shadow price of health capital). Combining the FOCs (∂L/∂ct = 0, ∂L/∂vt = 0 and

























We can then compare this condition with the one corresponding to the decentralized
solution, where each individual maximizes the utility Ut(ct, vt, nt, ht+1, πt) subject to (1),
(3), and ct, vt,mt, ht > 0, and wt and h0 (initial condition) are given. Combining the

















which describes the decentralized solution.10 The decentralized solution is not socially
optimal since equations (14) and (15) are different. These conditions differ in the last term
10For the particular case where adult consumption does not affect probability of NCDs (πt = π(ht))
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of (14) that clearly demonstrates the different sources of the intergenerational externality
not considered by individuals. They do not account for the direct effect of health capital
transmission on future generations, as captured by ξt+2(1− δ). Furthermore, they do not





. Indeed, if both effects vanish (i.e., δ → 1, and ε→ 0 implying ∂nt+1/∂ht+1 =
0) the externality disappears resulting in the equality of (14) and (15).
4.2 Taxes
Since individuals do not take into account the social transmission of NCDs we can set
taxes on unhealthy activities in order to reestablish social optimality. Let us consider
the decentralized problem with a tax (τt) on unhealthy consumption. The resulting tax
revenue ais used to subsidize (st) healthy activities mt (see, for instance, Goulão and
Pérez-Barahona, 2014; and Cremer et al., 2012).
Individuals maximize Ut(ct, vt, nt, ht+1, πt) subject to (3) and the modified budget
constraint
w = ct + (1− st)mt + (1 + τt)vt, (16)























Equating this expression to the social optimum condition (14), we get the optimal tra-
jectory for this policy as stated in the following proposition:
















Taxes allow the recovery of optimality, forcing households to internalize how their indi-
vidual choices affect future generations’ welfare.
This result contrasts to Kalamov and Runkel (2020) because in their setting a uni-
form tax is only second best. The authors have focused on the taxation problem when
unhealthy consumption in childhood creates habits and affects marginal utility of con-
sumption of the unhealthy good in adulthood. Conversely, the consumption of unhealthy




disappears in (14) and (15) because by assumption ∂πt/∂ht+1 = 0. In this case the
analogous of (15) is (4), as already stated in Section 3.
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uniform tax on unhealthy consumption cannot be first best because unhealthy goods con-
sumption has different externalities depending on the period of life in which consumption
occurs.
It is interesting to observe that, all other things being equal, ∂τt/∂ε < 0, meaning
that a stronger social norm (ε) is associated with a lower level of optimal tax. This is
an implication of assuming the functional utility form in (2), which makes the social





= −ε. Note also that in the absence of transmission mechanisms (δ → 1 and
∂nt+1/∂ht+1 = 0) the proposition directly shows that τt = 0 and, since at the equilibrium
stmt = τtvt, st = 0 as well.
4.3 Golden rule
To further explore the role of social norms on the tax level, we focus on the golden rule
problem defined in Chichilnisky et al. (1995). As in Mariani et al. (2010), the golden
rule allocation can be considered as a constrained social optimum in which the planner
maximizes the aggregate surplus at the steady-state. We can see it as the problem faced
by a “myopic” social planner, who treats all generations symmetrically (as if they were
all already at the steady-state) and ignores the transition process. The main advantage
of this constrained social optimum is the greater analytical tractability of the problem.
Additionally, by assuming further the step function (9), we can get a closed-form expres-
sion for the tax policy and the effect of the norm.11 This will allow us to tease out the
key mechanisms regarding social welfare.
In solving the golden rule problem the social planner maximizes U (c, v, n(h), h, π(h)),
subject to (1) and (3) at the steady-state, and c, v,m, h > 0. The Lagrangian for this
problem is









where ξ > 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier and w is given. From the FOCs (∂L/∂c = 0,
























By contrasting this expression with the decentralized condition (15) at the steady-




and δ. As before, individual choices are not
socially optimal because households neglect both direct and indirect effects of health
11Note that at the steady-state it is indifferent to assume that π ≡ π(ht) or alternatively π ≡ π(ht+1)
follow the step function (9).
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capital transmission. If δ → 1 and ∂n/∂h = 0 the decentralized solution would coincide
with the golden rule since the externality vanishes.
Proceeding as in section 4.2 we identify the optimal (golden) policy by equating con-




















As expected, without externality (δ → 1 and ∂n/∂h = 0) taxes/subsidies would not
be required and, therefore, τ = 0 and s = 0. We can follow the functional forms of
Section 3 and investigate the corresponding closed-form solutions.







[(1− δ)− ε] . (22)
Proof. At the steady-state, the probability π of suffering from a NCD is either πH or πL
provided the step function (9). Then, taking the corresponding FOCs and ∂π/∂h = 0, it
is easy to see that the optimal policy τ















h−n because the norm is defined as
n = εh. Finally (22) is obtained by rearranging terms.
Proposition 4 clearly shows that the strength of the norm (ε) decreases the tax. In
addition, the closed-form (22) allows us to identify further mechanisms behind this ef-
fect. We can see that the reduction of the tax will be greater the stronger the harm of
unhealthy activities (α) and the weaker the effectiveness of health maintenance activities
(σ). In contrast, a low transmission of health capital between generations (i.e., high δ)
reduces the effect because the externality would be moderate. Indeed, we recover the
generalized result that there is no need for corrective taxation in the extreme situation of
no transmission of health capital and the non-existence of social norm (δ → 1 and ε = 0).
In order to better understand how stronger social norms lessen taxes, let us examine
the golden rule allocation values. Considering the assumptions in Proposition 4, we
can compute the golden rule allocation values from the FOCs of the constrained social
planner.
Proposition 5 When the probability of NCDs is given by the step function in (9), the
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golden rule allocation is characterized by
hgπi =
γσ(1− πiφ)w








(α + σ)[(1 + λ) + γ(1− φπi)]
, (25)
mgπi =
[λα + (α + σ)γ(1− φπi)]w
(α + σ)[(1 + λ) + γ(1− φπi)]
, (26)
with i = {H,L}.
Note that the golden rule allocation is independent of the social norm. Since the golden
rule is maximizing welfare at the steady-state (constant health capital), whatever the level
of the social norm, health capital is kept constant. This effect is well captured by the
functional forms assumed, in particular (2). We can compare the golden rule allocation
with the decentralized solution. If there are no social norms (ε = 0), it can be shown
that hgπi > h
∗
πi
, cgπi < c
∗
πi
, vgπi < v
∗
πi
, mgπi > m
∗
πi
. Individuals invest too little in health and
therefore, health capital is too low with excessive levels of consumption. As shown in
Section 3, social norms (ε > 0) induce households to invest more in health (∂m∗πi/∂ε > 0),




and ∂v∗πi/∂ε < 0). Then, as with a social norm, individual choices get closer to the
optimal (golden rule) allocation, and it only requires a lower level of corrective tax to
make individuals internalize the intergenerational externality.12
Thus far, our analysis has shown that social norms can significantly modify the welfare
implications of the social transmission of NCDs. This is particularly evident when one
considers public policies to correct the associated intergenerational externality. As shown
above, the strength of social norms lessens the levels of taxes required to decentralize the
optimal policy. It follows naturally to query whether an appropriate implementation of
social norms can be used as an alternative to taxes. In the next section we will illustrate
this point by focusing on the long-run equilibrium.
4.4 Optimal health capital norm
We consider a planner who, instead of using taxes, searches for the strength of the norm
that maximizes social welfare at the steady-state. We are thus considering the golden
12Proposition 3 also underlines that a strong norm, ε > 1−δ, would induce an excessive level of health
investments, resulting in too much health capital and suboptimal levels of consumption. In this case the
tax would be negative, playing the role of a subsidy.
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rule problem in which the instrument variable is the level of the social norm instead of
the tax level. Let it be the optimal health capital norm under the golden rule problem.
In our model, the strength level of the norm is assumed to be constant; thus, focusing on
the level of the norm at the steady-state is a natural step in the analysis. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that the planner can directly set the social norm but abstract
from the technology that enables its implementation.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is useful to consider at the level of the norm
that would have been the most preferred by the individual at the steady-state. This is
obviously a conceptual construction that we use as benchmark. In reality, in our model
individuals live for two periods, and if they make part of the cohorts alive at the steady-
state, they take the norm as given. Using nt = εht in (2), the individual utility at the
steady-state becomes:
U∗πi = ln c
∗
πi




with i = {H,L}, and c∗πi , v
∗
πi
denoting individuals’ choices’ steady-state values. Provided
(11) and the individual choices (5)-(7), we can see that ε has two opposite effects on the




and ∂v∗πi/∂ε < 0. This effect is a direct consequence of the disutility of deviating from
the norm. It states that the strength of the norm reduces long-run utility for a πi given.
Therefore, ε = 0 would maximize individual utility if only this effect would be accounted
for.
However, the strength of the norm may affect πi through health capital accumulation.
Indeed, a strong enough norm may allow an economy in the first step of (9), πi = πH , to
sufficiently increase health capital and achieve the step πL. In other words, if an economy
is in a health trap, then a sufficient increase of the social norm allows the economy to
escape the health trap, as illustrated previously in Figure 3. However, escaping the health




hc, so that the most preferred level of the social norm is positive. We illustrate these two
possibilities in Figure 5.
Suppose the economy is in the health trap (πi = πH). Figure 5(a) shows that departing
from ε = 0 and increasing ε has the initial effect of reducing U∗πH due to the disutility
effect of the norm. Nevertheless, when the strength of the norm equals the critical value
εc identified in Proposition 2, the economy escapes the trap and the long-run welfare
becomes U∗πL > U
∗
πH
. Since U∗πL also diminishes with ε, the preferred level of the norm
would be ε∗ = εc. Figure 5(b) represents the scenario where the economy is in the high-
health-capital-low-probability-of-disease steady-state when ε = 0. For this case, setting














(b) Indirect effect is strong enough
Figure 5: Most preferred social health norm
individuals would prefer to “get rid” of the social norm because it acts as a constraint to
individuals’ choices, unless εc allows them to achieve a higher steady-state and a higher
level of utility.
Returning to the golden rule problem we proceed by analyzing the level of the so-
cial norm that decentralizes the golden rule allocation defined by (23)-(26). As noted
previously the golden rule allocation is not affected by the level of social norms as indi-
viduals’ behaviors are. The solution for the decentralization of the golden rule allocation
passes by equating condition (17) at the steady-state, with taxes set at zero, with (20)
and solving for ε. This basically results in (22), with taxes set at zero. Therefore, the
level of social norm that offsets the intergenerational externality emerging from health
capital transmission is 1− δ, i.e., the share of health capital transmitted to the following
generation.
Notwithstanding that 1−δ decentralizes the golden rule allocation, note that (23)-(26)
is conditional on the level of πi. Consider one economy in the health capital trap and in
which U∗πL > U
∗
πH
at εc; that is, individuals would be better off at the high steady-state
equilibrium at εc. Two situations may occur: either εc < 1 − δ or εc ≥ 1 − δ. In the
former case, implementing the golden rule with εg = 1− δ makes individuals bear a level
of health norm higher than they would have wished. In the latter case, εg = εc. That is,
the social planner would force the economy to escape the health capital trap. As a result,
the economy would escape the low steady-state and achieve a higher welfare at the high
steady-state (see Figure 5 a). At the same time, εc would also be the most preferred level
of the social norm. In a sense, both the planner’s intentions and individual preferences
would have been aligned.
The intuition behind this result is related to the effect of the health norms on the
transmission of NCDs and, in particular, on the level of health capital in the long term.
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The probability of suffering from a NCD is higher when the economy is in a health trap.
If the probability of NCD reduces welfare at the steady-state sufficiently, from a long term
perspective it is optimal to implement εc > 1− δ. Indeed, as shown before, health capital
at the steady-state is increasing with the social norm (see Figure 2). As a consequence,
the probability of a NCD would diminish, augmenting long-run welfare. It is necessary
to ensure that ∂U∗πi/∂πi < 0, though. Taking the individual choices at the steady-state
and ∂h∗πi/∂πi < 0, one can identify the necessary and sufficient condition for this to hold.
Proposition 6 summarizes these results.
Proposition 6 The golden rule allocation (23)-(26) is decentralized with εg = 1− δ, for
πi with i = {H,L}. Moreover, if the economy is in the low-health-capital-high-probability-
steady-state, the social norm εc ≥ εg = 1 − δ allows the economy to achieve the high-
health-capital-low-probability-steady-state, provided that ∂U∗πi/∂πi < 0.
Proof. Provided the functional forms of Section 3, the golden rule allocation is indepen-
dent of the level of ε (see (23)-(26)). Equating condition (17) at the steady-state, with
taxes set at zero, with (20) and solving for ε we get 1− δ, which is the value that decen-
tralizes the golden rule allocation (23)-(26). Note that ∂U∗πi/∂πi < 0 iff the probability
of suffering from a NCD has a strong enough effect on the long term health capital for
all ε ∈ (0, 1). From (11), we can see that the effect of the probability of suffering from a
NCD on h∗πi is negative; i.e., ∂h
∗
πi
/∂πi < 0. Then, considering (5)-(7) at the steady-state,
it is possible to show that ∂U∗πi/∂πi < 0 iff |∂h
∗
πi
/∂πi| > ψπi , where ψπi is defined as
ψπi ≡ γφ
{
(σ + λ)[(1− δ)− ε]




}−1{ σ + δ





A greater probability of suffering from a NCD induces individuals to discount more












πi). On the one hand, c
∗
πi
and v∗πi increase, raising U
∗
πi
. However, on the other
hand, it reduces U∗πi because πi is higher and, moreover, h
∗
πi
reduces. As observed in the
proof of Proposition 6, the overall impact is negative (i.e., ∂U∗πi/∂πi < 0) iff the latter
effect is stronger than the former one. This condition is the equivalent of saying that the
reduction of the long term level of health capital is large enough; i.e., |∂h∗πi/∂πi| > ψπi .
Note that this would be the case (sufficient condition) if health capital plays an
important role in determining the level of long term welfare: if h∗πi is “large”, Proposition
6 holds because ψπi < 0.
13 Moreover, the specific characteristics of the NCD can also
13From the definition of ψπi , it is easy to verify that ψπi < 0 for h
∗
πi > h̃πi where h̃πi ≡
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reinforce the reduction of the long term level of health capital. In our model, the disability
of the disease is represented by the parameter φ. It easy to confirm that φ raises |∂h∗πi/∂πi|
because individuals would give low value to the future if the NCD involves significant
disability.
5 Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to the emergence of recent contributions in the economic
modelling of epidemics. These contributions have now enriched a field that has previously
been overlooked, possibly because global infectious diseases apperead to be under control
(see Boucekkine et al., 2008 for a survey in the literature and Boucekkine et al., 2021 for
an introduction to the articles published in the special issue on the economics of epidemics
and contagious diseases published in the Journal of Mathematical Economics).
We contribute to the economic modelling of the epidemics of NCDs. Contrary to
infectious diseases, NCDs do not spread due to an external pathogen. We have modelled
the epidemics of NCDs by focusing on the importance of consumption choices and social
norms in relation to health capital. From the individual’s point of view, social norms
are constraints that impose utility costs. We have shown how a planner could use them
to offset negative intergenerational externalities not accounted for by the individual and,
consequently, to enhance welfare.
Social norms are important instruments to consider if other possibilities, such as
taxes on unhealthy goods, tend to be regressive. This is an issue often remarked on
in the literature on sin/unhealthy taxes since unhealthy goods tend to be consumed
disproportionally more by lower income individuals (see, among others, Allais et al. 2010;
Allcott et al. 2019; and Cremer et al. 2016 for the consequences of regressivity in
the political support of fat taxes). We do not assume the heterogeneity of individuals
or regressivity concerns to being able to characterize the health capital dynamics and
intergenerational transmission of NCDs. The regressivity of sin and unhealthy taxes is
nevertheless at the core of our motivations to consider social norms as instruments.
Additionally, in our model, setting a social norm is a black box problem; the process
for which we have not modelled here. Nonetheless, remaining agnostic as to how a social
norm is set, we could have assumed the use of tax revenues to finance a social norm
technology. Our choice, however, has been to concentrate our attention on the economic









Focusing on the steady-state utility and welfare (golden rule) enable us to avoid the
analysis of the full trajectory of “optimal social” norms. It also allows us to deal with
a tractable problem where the golden rule allocation is independent of the social norm,
even if the planner is respecting individuals’ preferences that change with a changing level
of the norm. A more complex matter would have been to consider the full trajectory of
social norms.
Finally, social norms on health related behaviors have considerably different impacts
on the dynamics of health capital, as opposed to the social norms in health capital. This
is the subject of our forthcoming work.
Appendices
A Strong social norms
We refer to ε > 1−δ as strong social norms. In this case, it is easy to see that mt > 0. The
positivity of ct and vt is satisfied too, although under the assumption of a sufficiently high
income wt ≥ 1/σ[ε− (1− δ)]ht. Strong social norms induce agents to keep a high level of
health conditions. Then, in contrast to the case ε ≤ 1−δ, the individual choices show that
greater inherited health conditions would increase health investment, decreasing general
and unhealthy consumption.
Under strong social norms, the dynamics of ht is also given by (8). It becomes (10) if
one considers the step function (9). Proposition 1 and the corresponding interpretation
of the dynamics also apply to strong social. We plot the steady-state equilibria in Figure
6. In contrast to the case ε ≤ 1−δ (see Figure 1), ϕ(ht) is steeper for higher probabilities
of disease because with strong social norms ∂ϕ′πi(ht)/∂πi > 0.
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